Abstract: This survey reviews the existing macro-level empirical literature on the link between infrastructure and development outcomes in a criti cal light. After providing a general framework that casts the relevant terms of the controversy on the real effect of infrastructure on growth in t he context of an aggregate production function, it signals what are the relevant empirical questions to be addressed. This guides the systematic review of a number of empirical studies and the discussion of the main econometric challenges to the identification of the effect of infrastructure on output and productivity.
Introduction
Infrastructure capital, understood as including transport related facilities (roads, railroads, ports and airports), water and waste water treatment facilities, tel ecommunications, and energy generation, transmission and distribution, is often mentioned as a prerequisite for the success of development policies and has therefore been for some time an important topic on the agenda of politicians and development practitioners that endow it with many virtues. Since the late 1980s, Economists have produced hundreds of empirical papers on the subject, mostly making use of macro-level data, i.e. cross country or cross state data.
------------
To date, despite all this accumulated evidence, the link between infrastructure availability and economic productivity or growth is still subject to considerable uncertainty and debate.
This survey takes stock of the existing macro-level literature to date in order to see how 15 years of sustained research have enhanced our understanding of this major development issue. To assess these contributions, it provides a general framework that spells out the relevant terms of the controversy on the real effect of infrastructure on growth in the context of an aggregate production function. It then signals in the context of this framework what are the relevant empirical questions to be addressed. This guides the systematic review of a nu mber of empirical studies, which seeks to identify to what extent answers have been provided to these key questions and discusses the main econometric challenges to the identification of the effect of infrastructure on output and productivity. Finally, building on related existing research, in particular in contract theory and political economy, it spells out several promising research avenues.
Infrastructure: A Review of Issues.
Infrastructure matters first because it provides key final consumption items to households, particularly water and to a lesser ext ent energy and telecommunications.
Overall, a rule of thumb is that between one third and one half of infrastructure services are used as final consumption by households (Prud'Homme, 2004; Fay and Morrison, 2007) .
Moreover, basic services such as water and electricity often occupy a significant fraction of poor households' budget. Foster and Yepes (2005) show that households in developing countries spend a significant fraction of their income on water and electricity. For example, in a sa mple of Latin American countries, households in the poorest quintile often spend more than 5% of their income on water and more than 7% on electricit y. In East Asia, figures from ADB, World Bank, JICA (2005) for 2003 show that the average share of total household expenditure spent on water services varies between 0.8% (China) and 3.2% (Cambodia), but can reach up to 16-33% for some of the poorest households in Indonesia for example. As for energy, average spending was 2.9% for Vietnam, 7.6% for China, 9% for Indonesia and 24% for Cambodia. From another angle, looking at the impact of privatization on welfare, McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) show that service extension to previously unconnected customers resulted in large welfare gains for the poorest households.
The other half of infrastructure services corresponds to intermediate consumption, mostly by firms. For small producers and local firms of developing countries, access to distant markets and contacts with potential clients rely on the existence of a suit able and relatively cheap transport and telecommunication network. Specific channels through which productivity costs may emerge span an array of phenomena that go from the complete inability to access certain markets in some rural areas, to t he impact of deficiency in infrastructure sectors on logistic costs and inventory levels (Guasch and Kogan, 2001) . 2 Recently, the development of mobile telephony has been shown to have an important effect on the abilit y to conduct business, for example in remote parts of Africa (Vodafone, 2005; Jensen, 2007) . Similarly, electricity is a vital input for many industrial and se rvice activities. Deficient electricity networks, plagued by frequent power outages and unstable voltage, may induce high costs and even deter some type of investments.
Indeed, people living in developing countries are well aware of how in frastructure shortcomings affect many aspects of their daily life and work. 3 Tap water that is available only a few hours a day, frequent power outages causing the breakdown of home appliances and machinery, communities that find themselves isolated each time it rains, frequently collapsed bridges, newly constructed roads already full of potholes, expensive mobile phone services as the only option when the hope of getting a fixed line installed is 2 For example, Japanese vehicle manufacturers in Thailand consider that Bangkok traffic congestion increases their costs by raising the amount of parts stock they need to hold (ADB, World Bank, JICA, 2005) . 3 See for example the World Bank World Development Indicators and Briceño-Garmendia, Estache and Shafik (2004) for statistics on access around the world.
a distant and costly dream, are all common stories in these countries. At the entrepreneurial level, in surveys assessing the investment climate, businesses usually rank deficient infrastructure as an important barriers to their operation and growth. For example, the World Bank investment climate assessment (ICAs) ind icate that a large proportion of respondents (between 20% in East Asia a nd the Pacific, and 55% in the Middle East and North Africa, as we ll as Latin America) view any of electricity, telecommunications or transpor t as a major or severe obstacle to doing business. 4 Similarly, 33% of Japanese firms operating in Vietnam consider poor infrastructure as the major obstacle to their business (ADB, Wo rld Bank, JICA, 200 5). Recently, Escribano and Guasch (2005) have developed an econometric methodology to assess the impact of investment climate assessments (ICAs) variables on firm-level productivity. Applying it to samples from Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua (Escribano and Guasch, 2006) , they find infrastructure to have a major impact on productivity. For example, they estimate a one percent increase in the average duration of power outages to decrease productivity by between 0.02 and 0.1%, while access to internet increases productivity by between 11 and 15%.
In this context, there is therefore an intuitive presumption that infrastructure levels and quality matter for firms' productivity and growth, and that a large part of the output and productivity differences that we observe across countries could be due to different endowments of such capital. Formalizing some of the stylized facts mentioned above, a standard formulation of this line of thinking would probably start from the argument that key infrastructure services, such as transpo rt, energy or communications, matter in a strongly complementary way to other productive input, and as such may constitute major bottlenecks if not or insufficiently available. (Kremer, 1993) , in which capital is made part of the multiplicative formulation in which quantity of any input cannot be substituted for quality of other key inputs like infrastructure, could be used to formalize such an argument.
Report and the IMD's World Competitiveness Yearbook. However, to the extent that infrastructure indices are used as an input into multivariate competitiveness indices, problems of circular reasoning and potential simultaneity are obviously not absent from these indices, making their use in applied economic research problematic.
However straightforward the presumption might appear, it is subject to considerable dispute based on both theoretical and empirical arguments. Prominent scholars have contested the notion that shortage of capital could credibly account for the large productivity differences between developed and developing countries. 6 Prescott (1998) points to differences in the incentive structure prevailing in these countries as a leading candidate explanation. Although he does not specifically discuss infrastructure capital, considering instead general physical as well as additional forms of intangible capital such as human capital, firm-specific learning-by-doing and organization capital, his approach might prove quite useful when applied to infrastructure, as it signals incentive arguments, applied specifically to infrastructure delivery and maintenance, as a potentially important topic that has largely been ignored in the literature. Related points are made by Hall and Jones (1999) and Parente and Prescott (2000) . Formal models can be found in Kocherlakota (2001) , who focuses on the interaction between limited enforcement and inequality to explain the failure to adopt high-TFP technol ogies, and Bental and Demougin (2006) , who explain productivity differences by endogenous differences in incentive schemes along the development path.
Alternatively, Banerjee and Duflo (2005) stress that they are huge differences in rate of returns within countries, so that many firms in developing countries are in fact not taking advantage of available technologies and investment opportunities. They point to "nonaggregative" reasons why this might be the case: government failures (inadequate regulations, excessive interventions), credit constraints and failing insurance markets, 6 The fact that output-per-worker in developing countries is lower than what is implied by the amount of capital available point is discussed for example in Prescott (1998) and Banerjee and Duflo (2005) . This mirrors Lucas (1990) 's initial point that the marginal product of capital implied by differences in outputper-worker between developed and developing countries is higher than the average rate we observe. Note that all these discussions are framed within a Cobb-Douglas type of specification.
intergenerational constraints, among others. 7 If this is the case, adding to the infrastructure capital stock m ay fail to significantly boost productivity as long as other types of bottlenecks remain.
Although not always grounded in th e same theoretical arguments, polar views are al so found in the large empirical literature that developed in the last 15 or 20 years to try to assess the real impact of infrastructure on output, growth and productivity. As we will see when reviewing these contributions in Section 3, authors have come up with everything from hugely positive output elasticities, as in the sem inal work of Aschauer (1989) Gramlich (1994) , who focused mostly on the US aspect of the debate to Sturm, Kuper and de Haan (1998) and Romp and d e Haan (2005) among others, these reviews have compared different methodologies and results, try to evaluate to what extent the available results allowed the identification of potential shortages in infrastructure and focused on policy-oriented questions such as the best way to finance infrastructure. Gramlich (1994) had 51 references, Sturm, Kuper and de Haan (1998) The structure of this paper is the fol lowing. Section 2 introduces the theoretical framework that will be used to structure the discussion of the empirical evidence. Section 3 then reviews a sample of macro-level empirical studies in the light of this framework, and discusses the main econometric challenges to the identification of the effect of infrastructure on output and productivity. Finally, section 4 considers potentially fruitful developments integrating incentive arguments and shows how these relate t o the key policy questions that are still on the agenda.
A Theoretical Framework
To structure the analysis, it is useful to put the discussion on the different effects of infrastructure on growth in a common framework. This debate can be framed by starting with a general form of the aggregate production function used in most of the literature: (2003) call a market-mediated effect of infrastructure. In this framework, at the end of each 8 Adding subscripts i and t would yield an inter-temporal production function at a lower level of aggregation, for example the regional or state level, but we abstract from this as it is not useful to our current discussion. A discussion of the assumptions behind the aggregation process that leads to (1) can be found in Banerjee and Duflo (2005) .
period, agents get the re turn from their investments in physical and human capital and consume the realized output, maximizing some utility function.
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There are several reasons to make infrastructure K I enter the production function through the services I(K I ) provided by this type of capital, rather than simply as an additional factor of production as is often done in the literature (Romp and de Haan, 2005) . First, introducing K I directly assumes that infrastructure has pure public good attributes and produces services proportional to th e stock of infrastructure in a non-rival and nonexcludable way. However, this is only partially true as infrastru cture is increasingly mediated through the market and has characteristics of standard private goods. In this case, its effect should indeed go, as i n (1), through the p roduction of specific services, like transport, communications, etc., that enter firms' production functions. 10 Second, despite the increasing market mediation of infrastructure, there is also strong evidence its costs and prices are largely not reflecting "fundamentals" of these activities, so it i s implausible that this type of capital is remunerated according to its marginal productivity, even in a world of constant returns to scale. 11 When the unit cost of infrastructure is not market determined, it is therefore questionable to include it as a factor in the production function, as firms would not be able to make informed decisions on the cost of the amount of infrastructure capital they use (Duggal, Saltzman and Klein, 1999) . This has prompted several authors to instead consider that infrastructure is part of the total factor productivity term A, for example because it influences productivity by lowering costs or through economies of scales resulting from market expansion. A generic formulation would be:
9 To reconcile this with the fact that part of infrastructure services are directly consumed by households, consider that the composite capital stock of this economy (physical and infrastructure capital) is made of the unique final good, as is usual in such models. Thus in a sense, infrastructure capital is both consumed and used as intermediate input. 10 Fernald (1999) adapts this "service" approach to study the impact of the road infrastructure in the US on specific industrial sectors according to their vehicle-intensity. 11 See Pritchett (1996) The second important question is wh ether there are some sizable indirect infrastructure effects, which raises the problem of disentangling direct vs. indirect effects of infrastructure capital on output and deriving their relative signs and magnitude. Thirdly, a related issue concerns the relative importance of θ and K I in explaining the observed shifts in A(.). Advocates of the "infrastructure matters a lot" view would argue that most of the gains in productivity over time ultimately stem from improved infrastructure services (K I ), while at the other extreme, it would be argued that other types of externalities (θ), which we discuss in more details below, are responsible for the gains.
Between these two extremes, some correlation may exist between both dimensions, so that the potential external benefits from infrastructure services only materialize in the presence of the right set of incentives, for example at the level of the regulatory framework, of the pol itical game, etc. Bef ore discussing th e theoretical motivations for these questions, we summarize them formally: Are there interactions between both?
The theoretical underpinning of growth externalities can be found in several literatures, including the en dogenous growth theory 13 and the new economic geography. 14 As for specific infrastructure related externalities, a few examples include higher quality electricity supply making possible the use of more sophisticated machines, and better transport infrastructure that, by lowering transport costs, leads to economies of scale, a different pattern of agglomeration and better inventory management (Hulten et al., 2003; Baldwin et al., 2004) . Other potential channels involve the pattern of specialization of agents, as well as incentives to invest in innovation as the transport and communication infrastructure, and therefore access to market, change. Economies of scale due to network externalities are still another important explanation in the case of network industries.
As for m ore general types of externaliti es, the main candidate category is a broad one labeled "incentives". Prescott (1998) mentions two specific historical examples. In the 13 Standard general endogenous growth theory references are Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) . Agénor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) discuss several channels through which infrastructure may affect growth in these models.
14 Krugman (1998) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) are seminal references in the new economic geography literature. Baldwin et al. (2004) offer extensions and discuss infrastructure policy implications. Straub (2007) summarizes the contribution of this literature to the debate on infrastructure.
first one, drawn from Wolcott (1994) , he argues that productivity differences between Indian and Japanese cotton mills, in the period 1920 to 1938, can be traced back to the ability of worke rs to resist o rganizational changes, itself due t o differences in the composition of the population of workers, rather than to d ifferences in technology.
Similar reasons appear to explain the century-long pattern of productivity changes in strongly unionized coal mining in the US, with surges in productivity only occurring when changes in the environment (competition from low-price oil and from nonunionized mines) presented workers with an alternative between changing work practice to allow the use of more efficient technology or seeing the mines closed. Finally, Prescott argues that the large observed industry-level differences in productivity among developed countries such as the US, Japan, Germany, the UK and France, can hardly be attributed to differences in skills or the stock of useable knowledge, and m ust instead be related to constraints such as laws, regulations or union power.
Recent contributions that blend endogenous growth theory with contract th eory are promising avenues to understand how the incentive structure prevailing in key areas such as R&D or gove rnment services affect the growth path of an economy (e.g. Martimort and Verdier, 2004; Sarte, 2002; Erlich and Lui, 1999) . As fo r geographical linkages, This points to another key question implicit in the theoretical framework presented above, namely whether an increase in t he infrastructure capital stock will have a permanent or only a transitory effect on growth of per capita income in the specific geographical and temporal setting under study.
Question Set 2: Is the effect of additional infrastructure investment a permanent or a transitory one?
Ultimately, the question boils down to whether we believe that infrastructure (or its combination with other policies) generates enough externalities to induce constant returns on aggregate and leads to endogenous growth, in whic h case it will have a perm anent effect on the growth rate, or that we are in a standard neoclassical case with decreasing returns where any investment in infrastructure will only have transitory effects, increasing the level of output but not the long-run growth rate. Note that this is not to say that a transitory positive shock, like the huge infrastructure investment in Vietnam since 1995 (near 10% of GDP on average) or in Thailand since 2001 (above 15 % of GDP),
would not be desirable. If it has the effect of shifting the economy to a higher level of output, even with the growth rate then going back to its previous level, this may still be a desirable policy, subject to cost-benefit considerations.
Another way to look at this debate is to think in terms of rate of returns to infrastructure.
If such rates of return are higher in situations of under provision, characteristic of many developing countries, but decline as the stock of infrastructure increases, infrastructure is likely to provide a one time boost to growth but not to have a permanent effect.
Alternatively, the network effect story claims returns are higher at higher level of coverage (at least for some type of services/sectors), providing one possible mechanism through which a on e time investment in infrastructure, leading to cross a threshold in terms of service coverage, may have permanent effects on the growth rate.
Finally, the question of the optimality of infrastructure stocks introduces an a dditional twist in the debate. Indeed, knowing whether the stock of a given type of infrastructure is below or above its optimal point should have important policy consequences.
Question Set 3: Can we identify a country's optimal infrastructure stock?
Given the (at l east partial) public good nature of infrastructure, determining the optimal level of the infrastructure stock would require equating the social marginal benefits to marginal costs (Romp and de Haan, 2005) . However, as discussed in Pritchett (1996) , the determination of the cost of infrastructure is a maj or challenge. Moreover, there are additional issues with this macroeconomic approach. Indeed, one could imagine situations characterized both by an adequate aggregate stock of infrastructure and specific local bottlenecks. This would arise for example if roads development concentrates in specific regions for political reasons, 15 or if the conditions that make a g iven stock of infrastructure optimal for private business development vary from regions to regions, as for example labor regulation across Indian states as shown in Besley and Burgess (2004) .
As pointed out in Gramlich (1994) , there have been several ways of estimating the optimal stock of infrastructure, including engineering assessments of needs, political measures based on voting behavior, measures of rate of return and econometric estimates, and none have provided definitive answers or methodology.
The discussion above raises the question of how the theoretical debate on th e different questions we have i dentified is mirrored at the econometric level. The next section attempts to systematically organize what can be le arned from the existing empirical literature according to this framework.
The Empirical Evidence
This section reviews a sample of 80 different specifications from 30 macro-level studies, In terms of technical characteristics, there is also a lot of variation. Looking at the whole set of specifications, we see that 66% use panel data, and fixed effects are included in 35% of them. The underlying theoretical framework is either a production function (58%), cross country regressions (37%), cost function (1%) or growth accounting (4%).
As for the dependent variable being explained, it is either output (60%), output growth (30%), productivity (9%) or inequality (1%). The independent variable used as a proxy for infrastructure is either some measure of public capital (44%) or a physical indicator (56%).
General conclusions from empirical studies
16 In a given paper, specifications testing the effect of different types of infrastructure services (telecom, transport, electricity, etc.) are considered separately, and so are estimations using different techniques (e.g. panel data, then collapsed cross-country) or those testing the effect on different dependent variables. The list of studies included, classified by type of data and techniques used is in the Appendix. 17 A similar "meta-analysis" exercise on a larger sample of studies, including micro-econometric studies, is undertaken in Straub (2007) . The insights from the present sample should be considered as illustrative only.
What are the main questions addressed in the literature under review? The overwhelming majority of specifications (77 out of 80 ) limit themselves to estimating the output or growth elasticity of infrastructure capital without putting anymore theoretical structure on the problem (our question 1.A). The disentangling of direct versus indirect effects is rarely tackled (5 cases), and so is the qu estion of the nature of indirect effects (4 cases).
Additionally, 36 specifications also attempt to distinguish permanent from transitory effects, although 22 of these are simply cross-country specifications that by construction imply the estimation of long term effects. Finally, only 5 sp ecifications are concerned with the estimation of countries' optimal stocks of infrastructure.
What can we infer from the 80 specifications under study? Overall, a little over half of them (45, equivalent to 56%) conclude to a po sitive and si gnificant effect o f infrastructure, while 30 (38%) find no effect and 5 (6%) find a negative and significant effect. Below, we consider the res ults of these studies according to the taxonomy of questions outlined in Section 2, and consider specifically how the var iations in sample, techniques and type of variables used affect the conclusions.
The output elasticity of infrastructure (question 1.A)
As mentioned above, most of the available empirical evidence (96%) simply reports some estimate of the output elasticity of infrastructure capital. This is done by inserting some measure of infrastructure in a specification already containing general capital as an explanatory variable. Table 1 gives an overview of the distribution of results, classifying them as either negative and significant (-1), non significant (0) or positive and significant (+1), according to a number of characteristics of the studies, namely sample type, type of dependent and independent variables, and theoretical framework used. A number of sty lized facts emerge from this initial view o f the data. Overall, positive effects of infrastructure are found more often in samples of developed countries, and when the dependent variable is output level rather than output growth or productivity. As for the independent variable, more conclusive results are obt ained by studies using physical indicators rather than measures of public capital. Within these categories, looking at the specific sectors for which more than a few studies are in cluded, positive effects are found mostly for telecom, roads and electricity in that order. Finally, studies based on a production function framework reach more positive conclusions that those relying on cross-country regressions. These results are discussed further in what follows when specific issues like permanent versus transitory effects, or the quality of different indicators of infrastructure are addressed.
As for the value of the estimates found in the literature, a first generation of studies on US state-level data, such as Aschauer (1989) , Munnell (1990) and Ford and Poret (1991) , found output elasticities of public capital varying between 0.31 and 0.54. Estimates of the marginal product of a unit of public capital from these elasticities are bound to be approximate, as the results are very sensitive to measurement errors in the ratio Y/G, but the rough implication is a marginal product around 100%, meaning that infrastructure would pay for itself in one year or less (Gramlich, 1994) . For this reason, these numbers have often been dismissed as unrealistic. In particular, as Gramlich (1994) pointed out, they raise the question of why capital does not flow to infrastructure investment if rates of return there largely outperform those of other types of investments.
A first l ine of response to this critique relies on industry-level studies. For example, Fernald (1999) similarly estimates huge rates of re turn on investment in roads for US industries that use roads more intensively: in terms of a Cobb-Douglas specification like the ones used in state-level studies, he finds an output elasticity of road investment around 0.35. After noting that this is consistent with the initial results from Aschauer, he argues that the massive interstate highway network built in the 50s and 60s generated a one-time boost in productivity (of approximately 1%) rather than a permanent one, also explaining the post-1973 slowdown in productivity. 18 In short, initial large investments in infrastructure may produce very high rate of returns, but this is n o guarantee that additional investments would also be characterized by the same returns. In this view, Aschauer's results adequately captured the pre-1973 period. Additionally, this line of argument coincides well with the idea that once basic infrastructure is in place, adequate investment in maintenance might actually have a higher rate of return than new investment, as argued in Hulten (1996) , who uses a cross-country sample similar to that of Easterly and Rebelo (1993) and finds that the impact of an effectiveness index of infrastructure is more than seven tim e larger t han that of public capital itself (see also Rioja, 2003) . (1996) find the effect of public capital to b e insignificant.
Addressing endogeneity sources of infrastructure
Accordingly, in the second generation of studies incorporating these concerns, the positive estimates found were significantly smaller than those of Aschauer, with elasticities around 0.1 to 0.2 (Romp and de Haan, 2005) . Note, however, that these numbers are still quite high, as for the US case for example they imply rates of return of between 25 and 50%.
This conclusion is supported by a quick look at our sample of studies, as shown in Table   2 below. In panel settings, while three quarter of the specifications yield positive and significant results when fixed effects are not included, and none yield negative outcomes, 18 The total post-1973 US productivity slowdown was about 1.3%. Yeaple and Golub (2004) using an industry level panel across countries similarly find significant positive effects of infrastructure on TFP growth and on industrial specialization. 19 While growth accounting using single-country time-series data implicitly controls for these unobserved region-specific effects, production function-based estimates do not, so they need to explicitly incorporate fixed effects.
the use of fixed effects leads to less positive estimation outcomes, and some significantly negative ones. instruments. In particular, the effects of infr astructure may take time to materialize, for example if the construction of new transport links or electricity connections only leads to new business development with a significant lag; growth rate themselves have a distributed lag structure; and we are often dealing with relatively small samples, which casts doubt on the asymptotic properties of the IV-estimators (Holtz-Eakin, 1994). A related question may therefore concern the power of the tests involved. A closely related strategy is employed by Devarajan et al. (1996) , who use a forward lag structure for the dependent variable. Alternatively, Easterly and Rebelo (1993) use as instruments continent dummies, as well as country level structural characteristics such as population size and share of agriculture in GDP. It is unclear, however, whether these last two are plausibly excluded from the growth regression. Garcia-Milà et al. (1996) are indeed unable to reject exogeneity in a panel of US states.
common idea is that the co rrelation across regions or industries reflect s some common global trends and is orthogonal to specific regional or industry level unobserved effects.
However, while such instruments are well suited when the source of endogeneity is the presence of unobserved effects, because say more prosperous states/countries also have characteristics that make them more likely to spend more on infrastructure, their use must be subject to more caution in the case of reverse causation. This leads us to consider the two additional causes of endogeneity (see Woo ldridge, 2002, for a discussion) that may be related to our theoretical framework. The first one is the potential correlation between infrastructure capital, used as an explanatory variable, and the error term because of omitted variables. To the extent that such estimations will necessarily omit some relevant aspects for which suitable proxies are typically difficult to find, in particular those making up what we characterized as generic types of incentives externalities θ, the risk is that estimates of the total effect of infrastructure will be artificially inflated. As noted above, while fixed-effects or fi rst differencing may help address this problem under the assumption that the unobserved effects are time invariant, they would fail if these effects vary across time. 23 In this case, an instrumental approach using the types of variables described in the previous paragraph would be appropriate.
22 I thank Douglas Holtz-Eakin for making this point. 23 Note also that first differencing destroys the long term relationships in the data (e.g. for labour and private capital) so it is unclear whether it still allows their identification (Duggal et al, 1999; Sturm et al., 1998) .
Additionally, measurement errors may also create such bias. Although Garcia-Mila, McGuire and Porter (1996) test for measurement errors using the Griliches and Hausman test on US annual state-level public capital data and conclude to no significant measurement problems, data based on some form of public investment indicators do need to be treated with caution, especially in developing countries where the quality of these indicators is often mediocre. Indeed, issues of data comparability and measurement errors are likely to be responsible for the huge discrepancy in results across studies.
The first problem is th e choice of proxy. Here, an example from the cross-country approach will make that point clear. Barro (1 991) and Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find that an increase in public investment in transport and communications leads to higher growth, while Milbourne at al. (2003) find the effect not to be significantly different from zero and Devarajan at al. (1996) find a signi ficant negative effect. In the discussion of their results, Devarajan at al. (1996) partly attribute the discrepancies to the fact that their data differ in many dimensions from those used in other studies. They mention first that Barro (1991) uses different criteria to decide which part of public expenditures are productive or not, second that Easterly and Rebelo (1993) use measures that aggregate government expenditures at all levels and expenditures by public ent erprises, while they restrict themselves to central government data, and third that Easterly and Rebelo do not control for level effects of expenditures, thus mixing composition and level effects. Given the sensitivity of results to t he infrastructure proxies used, the choice of indicators appears to be crucial.
Choice of indicators
As mentioned above, two main types of infrastructure proxies have been used in the empirical literature: Public ca pital (based on some monetary measure of public infrastructure capital investment) and physical indicators of service production or coverage.
Note first that, given the increasing part of i nfrastructure investments corresponding to the private sector in the last decades, public capital is unlikely to overlap completely with infrastructure investment. To take only a few examples, in the period 1996-2001, the shares of total spending in infrastructure corresponding to the public and the private sector respectively amounted to 1.37 and 1.02% of GDP in Brazil, 0.27 and 0.98% of GDP in Mexico and to 2.93 and 4.35% of GDP in Bolivia (Calderón and Servén, 2004) .
To the extent that we are interested in the effect of infrastructure capital, however it is financed, on growth, rather than in the effect of fiscal policy, this is obviously problematic. If variations of the private share of infrastructure investment across sectors or countries are not random, an as sumption that seems likely to be verified, relying on public capital as a pr oxy for total infrastructure investment therefore introduces a systematic measurement error.
The second problem has to do with the argument found in Pritchett (1996) , who argues that whatever the measure of capital stock used, the numbers available overlook the fact that cumulated investment flows are not reasonable proxies for the true effective capital stocks, because the costs of the se investments are likely to differ from their values.
Justifications for this include simple government inefficiency, potential corruption, or departure from efficiency for redistributive motives among others.
The weakness of p ublic capital as a proxy for i nfrastructure services is reflected in the fact that estimations using aggregate public capital fail to find any effect about half of the time, as sho wn above in Table 1 . Partly to circumvent the measurement problems discussed above, cross-country physical indicators, like kilometers of road, number of phone lines, or electricity generating capacity, have become a standard alternative.
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However, their widespread use also r aises important questions, both with respect to the accuracy and the quality of these measures. Consider for example an indicator supposed to capture the availability of transport infrastructure, "total road length". The first issue is whether the raw indicator is significant, or should be scaled along or adjusted for different dimensions, such as population, land area, or other geographical characteristics. 25 Moreover, anyone having traveled in a low or middle-income developing country is aware of how widely the quality of "paved road" can vary. Finally, it is well known that political considerations often lead to roads being paved where it serves the ruler or its friends rather than where it is more efficient, as already spelled out by Adam Smith in the 18 th century, so similar extensions of road can have a very different impact depending on their spatial distribution.
Another widely used indicator is e lectricity generation capacity. Consider the case of , and of suitable quality measures, which are notably absent from standard databases. 26 Note indeed that electricity generating capacity measured in this way is the indicator that more often fails to produce significant results (Table 1) . 25 Most studies simply ignore this issue and use the raw indicators. 26 See Briceño-Garmendia, Estache and Shafik (2004) for a discussion of the issue of quality indicators and an overview of existing data.
Indirect Effects (Questions 1.B and 1.C)
Few papers have addressed this question. In our sample, only Hulten et al. (2000 Hulten et al. ( , 2005 , La Ferrara and Marcelino (2000) and Duggal et al. (1999) do so. Except the last one, these contributions use a g rowth accounting framework. Indeed, when discussing estimates of the effect of infrastructure, a first issue is simply to recognize that empirical analysis based on some version of a Cobb-Douglas production function approach (this is the case of 15 out of the 17 production function-based studies in our review sample) has in general lit tle to say on the indirect effects, as this specification does not allow to distinguish it from the direct effect. Growth accounting techniques suffer from a similar problem, as they are unable to discriminate the direct effect of infrastructure for reasons discussed above, namely the difficulty to attribute a price to infrastructure capital. Indeed, as infrastructure is partially a public good, not remunerated at its marginal productivity, its share of the output can only be guessed, which makes the estimates subject to caution. 27 Note that in most cases, growth-accounting studies fi nd lower levels of infrastructure externalities fo r more developed countries or regions than for developing ones. For example, applying a si milar framework to both cases, Hulten and Schwab (2000) show that US state level data displayed no significant infrastructure externalities on growth, while Hulten et al. (2005) found infrastructure to account for a significant part of TFP growth (about half of it in the case of highways and electricity) across Indian states in the period 1972-1992.
Two remarks follow. First, if the total effect of infrastructure on output is high overall, but externalities are low, it may be that most of the effect of infrastructure is a direct one.
Alternatively, it could also be that, due to the weakness of estimation techniques, the production function approach in fact captures as part of the direct effect a significant fraction of the productivity-enhancing externalities that are not due to infrastructure but rather to other type of factors falling in the "incentives" category. On the other hand, it is not clear to what extent the significant infrastructure externalities found for example in the Indian case are purged of other com plementary externalities. Further work is still needed to tell these assumptions apart.
Permanent versus transitory effects (Question 2)
Although this appears to be a crucial issue of this line of research, again little convincing evidence emerges. We noted in Table 1 that specifications using output level as dependent variable are generally more supportive of a po sitive effect of infrastructure than those using either output growth or productivity. Although it does not control for other potentially non random specificities of these studies, this could be interpreted as an indication that transitory effects (shifting the aggregate level of output through a temporary investment shock rather t han the long term growth rate) are more often observed.
This point can be further developed by considering a recent example from the empirical literature. Calderón and Servén (2004) have argued that raising Latin American quantities and qualities of infrastructure stocks to E ast Asian Tigers' level would generate longterm per capita growth gains of around 3%. Note however that if the claimed causation running from the level of infrastructure stocks to growth rates were literally true, all growth in the US and Europe, which have high quant ities and good quality of infrastructure and long-term growth rates of 2-3%, would be attributable to their levels of infrastructure stocks.
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Perhaps another way to i nterpret these esti mates is to say that, because of distinct incentive structures between Latin America countries and East Asian ones, their economies are settled at different equilibria that display marked gaps in both infrastructure stocks and output growth. Again, the right objective would be to disentangle the part of these incentive differences that has to do wit h potential 28 We thank Michael Warlters for pointing this out.
infrastructure externalities from the part that boils down to different types of issues (question 1.C above). The global estimate of Calderón and Servén (2004) might then be biased upwards because it includes part of the effect of what we have called generic incentives (θ). Several contributions have shown for example that differences in the nature and efficiency of the regulatory framework, the quality of contracts, the political economy of the process, the quality of the local bureaucracy, the level of corruption, etc., have all had an impact on the business environment for infrastructure operators and the efficiency of their investments. 29 Moreover, as far as priv ate sector involvement was concerned, Latin America went mostly for concessioning of retail and distribution facilities, while East Asia focused on BOT for who lesale facilities (e.g. power plants), which raised fewer direct po litical concerns, and was m ore successful in managing the financing through its higher savings. So despite Latin America having more mature regulatory frameworks than East Asia, the characteristics of the pr ocess were such that Latin America may have experienced more severe incentive and information problems.
Alternatively, we could read the Calderón and Servén's result as saying that with a huge investment in infrastructure, Latin America would generate additional per capita growth for a fairly long time. Obviously this is d ifferent from claiming that a higher stock of infrastructure capital implies a higher steady state growth rate, although transitory effects may look permanent when the transition period lasts long enough. In the limit, a permanent increase in the flow of infrastructure investment may imply an increase in the long-term growth rate. Again, this issue is clearly in need of more research.
Finally, Canning (1999) and Canning and Pedroni (2004) have proposed an alternative methodology to address this issue, that partly overlaps with the issue of the determination of optimal infrastructure stocks. We discuss these studies in the next subsection
Optimal stocks of infrastructure (Question 3)
Despite the seemingly crucial relevance of this topic, it has attracted very little attention in the empirical literature, probably because of the technical challenges it raises. In our review sample, only three papers touch upon it. Canning and Pedroni (2004) consider it in the con text of a p anel of countries, while Aschauer (2000) looks at a p anel of US States. Finally, Cadot et al. (2005) provide indirect evidence on the non-optimality of infrastructure investment decisions by showing that these are mainly politically driven.
Aschauer (2000) assumes a steady-state output elasticity of infr astructure of 0.30, a questionable value in line with his initial paper, in o rder to determine whether actual stocks are indeed optimal. As in previous work, however, this study fails to address issues of simultaneity between output and infrastructure, casting doubt on the relevance of the re sults. A m ore econometrically sophisticated study is Canning and Pedroni (2004) . They start from a Barro-type of growth model, and use panel-based unit root and cointegration tests to d etermine the sign of infrastructure long run effects. A positive (resp. negative) sign is then taken to mean that the infrastructure stock is below (resp. above) its optimal level.
Two main shortcomings can be pointed out here. First, the concept of optimal aggregate stock of infrastructure may in fact be of limited policy relevance, when instead a large part of the effects of specific types of infrastructure services on economic activities are typically of a local nature. Ultimately, what is optimal for economic agents will depend on the national environment but also on a string of physical, geographical and institutional variables, part of which display significant within-country variations.
Because it fails to inform the crucial question of the spatial distribution of services across regions, districts, etc., any macroeconomic answer is therefore bound to be of limited policy usefulness. Moving to a lower level of aggregation (the state level in US or Indian data for example) should go some way toward solving this problem, but at the same time,
because a large part of infrastructure is both of local and national use (for example roads that cross and connect different regions), and because there might be inter-regional spillover benefits from the infrastructure stock, it obviously raises other difficult questions with respect to allocation of costs and benefits of infrastructure to one local area rather than another.
Second, the results in Cadot et al. (2006) show that in a world of limited resources and non-perfectly benevolent governments, assessing the optimality of past and present infrastructure investment decisions (including the choice between new investments and maintenance of existing ones) should be based on a positive theory of these decisions.
Similar work in the context of developing countries would therefore be extremely useful.
We discuss in the last section of this paper how the political economy literature could provide part of the ingredients necessary to such an approach.
Other Issues
Having looked at the different problems likely to bias estimates of the effects of infrastructure and at how they have been addressed in the literature, we also need to consider the possibility that results may simply differ according to the geographical areas and time periods analyzed. While the level of aggregation should matter little as long as suitable controls are used (Holtz-Eakin, 1994) , different pictures tend to emerge for groups of developing countries vs. developed one, or for a given country in the 1950s or 1960s vs. the 1990s. Several theoretical arguments are relevant here. First, as was already mentioned above, initial investments to establish specific road or communication infrastructure for example may only have a one-time effect on productivity. In particular this may mean that developing countries with acute infrastructure shortages should characterized by high returns to these inv estments. Alternatively, network effects are often mentioned in the literature as a motive for why specific infrastructure investments may produce higher returns once some minimum critical threshold in term of coverage is crossed. Note that the two arguments imply opposite effects and that their empirical disentangling may be difficult. Indeed, they can alternatively be used to justify that returns to infrastructure investment are either higher or lower in developing countries.
As for specific results on the relevance of the level of development, dissenting views are found in the literature. Devarajan et al. (1996) , using a sample of 43 developing countries, find the effect of public capital expenditures to be negative. Their interpretation is that developing country governments have been misallocating expenditures resulting in excessive capital spending. This, however, runs in the face o f some anecdotal evidence, in particular from Latin America, showing that the capital part of public budgets has repeatedly been sacrificed to current expenditures (Easterly and Servén, 2003; Fay and Morrison, 2007) .
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Overall, the sample of specifications reviewed displays more systematically positive returns to infrastructure in developed country. This, together with the fact that some studies find low returns to infrastructure in developing countries, however, does not necessary invalidate the productivity-boosting view and support the network externality one. Instead, it may indicate that the first effect would only materialize in the presence of a set of conditions enabling the development of productive activities, among which the right set of incentives and a minimum critical mass of suitable human capital. An interesting potential question appears therefore to concern interactions between infrastructure and proxies for these effects. We return to this issue in the next section.
Some evidence also suggests the existence of the a forementioned network externalities.
Overall, 9 specifications, from 3 papers, claim to explicitly test for the existence of network effects. The first 2 papers (Röller and Waverman, 2001; Torero et al., 2005) simply do so by running estimations on sub samples of richer and poorer countries respectively, which raises among others the problem of sample selection. Röller and Waverman (2001) find that in the case of telecom investment, significant network externalities kick in at near universal service level, while Torero et al. (2005) find that the effect is stronger among middle income ones. Using an endogenous threshold panel model à la Hansen, in which infrastructure itself is the threshold variable, Hurlin (2005) reaches a somewhat different conclusion. He argues that such effects are relevant especially at intermediate levels of infrastructure development, where the productivity of infrastructure investments is signi ficantly higher than that of other types of investment, while it is not more productive at either low level of coverage or w hen the network is completed. It is not specified, however, which underlying theoretical mechanisms could
give rise to such a pattern.
Finally, a careful discussion of rates of returns to infrastructure requires us to think much more carefully about specific sector and project characteristics. 31 Important differences may arise depending on whether the p olicy focus is on the rate of return of a marginal investment or on the average rate of return over a string of investments, for example over 
Incentives
The effect of the generic t ype of incentives externalities is relevant to macro-level estimations to the extent that some degree of complementarity exists between these and infrastructure externalities, or in other words, if potential infrastructure externalities may only materialize when other conditions are fulfilled. While in this case the attribution of the returns to one or the other source is bound to be arbitrary, the identification of such interactions would be extremely relevant from a policy point of view. In this section, we review three aspects that may exhibit such complementarities with infrastructure, namely regulatory frameworks and market structure, institutional quality and political economy.
Regulatory frameworks and market structure
Because they often have characteristics of natural monopolies, infrastructure sectors are generally subject to a regulatory framework. The theoretical literature has long stressed the role of imperfect information, adverse selection and moral hazard, in determining the second best nature of public regulation (see for example Laffont and Tirole, 1993 and 2000) . In this context, the first relevant aspect to our discussion stems from possible regional or sectorial variations in the extent of information asymmetries and in the commitment power of infrastructure investors, operators and host governments.
Moreover, departing from the assumption that regulators are benevolent introduces additional concerns (Laffont, 2005) . In particular, when governments have weak commitment power and large asymmetries of information exist, there are several ways in which the potential returns from infrastructure investment might be partly or entirely suppressed or appropriated, leading to a shortfall in such investment.
When evaluating the returns t o infrastructure investments, it becomes important to consider that p roblems of contract enforcement, expropriations, and opportunistic renegotiations have in many cases plagued infrastructure projects and are likely be obstacles to the maximization of such re turns, especially when investment stems from private operators (Guasch, 2004) . Straub (2003 and have shown that the choice of the incentive structure (price cap vs. rate of return for example), and the fact that a regulator is or not in place at the signing of the contract, have a major impact on the likelihood of transport and water concession contracts renegotiation in Latin America.
The channels through which weak regulatory frameworks may affect the returns to infrastructure investments are various. By making opportunistic political interference more likely (Guasch, Laffont and Straub, 2006) they increase the likelihood of ex post expropriation of sunk investments, which often results in a degradation in maintenance, a lack of follow-up in planned investments, etc., and may jeopardize the realization of medium term returns. Even in the absence of renegotiations or expropriations, Cubbin and Stern (2005) and Estache and Rossi (2005) have shown that the electricity sector is more efficient in countries that e njoy a regulatory law and higher quality regulatory governance.
Moreover, market structure also appears to matter in conjunct ion with effective regulation. In those sectors and places where the introduction of competition has been successful, Wallsten (2001) , among others, show that telecommunications are significantly more efficient and reach higher level of coverage. Similar conclusions arise from a review of the UK's privatization experience, as discussed in Parker (2004) and Newbery (2004) . More generally, there is a presumption that the market structure that results from the ownership and regulatory choices imposed on a g iven sector will crucially affect potential access, prices, etc., all variables that are likely to be relevant to the social return of infrastructure, as shown for example in Estache, Laffont and Zhang (2005) .
To my knowledge, the effects of the quality of the regulatory framework along such dimensions, as well as that of market structure, have never formally been considered in the context of studies looking at the effect of infrastructure investment on output or productivity, and may constitute a promising area for research. One important challenge here will be the potential endogeneity of such aspects. A combination of fixed effects estimations and/or the use of instrumental variables of the type developed in Holtz-Eakin (1994) and Guasch, Laffont and Straub (2006) (see section 3) should allow this problem to be addressed appropriately.
Institutional quality
Some of the aspects mentioned above have to do more generally with the quality of the institutional framework of the host economy (quality of contracts, enforcement, corruption, etc.). Here again, there is a widely held presumption, supported by some sparse empirical evidence, that better functioning institutions should in general contribute to the realization of infrastructure returns. Formally, Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) , using a structural model of infrastructure and output growth, display estimates that support the key role of generic institutional capabilities, such as contract enforcement and bureaucratic efficiency, in enabling high infrastructure returns. The important role of such aspects in mediating disruptive events such as renegotiations is h ighlighted in Straub (2003 and . Dal Bo and Rossi (2004) stress the fact that greater corruption, as measured by subjective perception indices in a cross-country of Latin American countries, is significantly associated with lower efficiency in electricity distribution.
Moreover, this last study points to an additional interesting aspect, which is the importance of the ownershi p structure, as a cha nnel through which institutional weaknesses may affect the operation of infrastructure sectors. Indeed, Dal Bo and Rossi show that the effect of corruption is stronger for publicly owned firm. Martimort and Straub (2006) develop a model of privatization that highlights sectorial and economywide conditions under which corruption may be higher under private ownership, and relate this to popular dissatisfaction with privatizations in Latin America.
Political economy
As mentioned previously, some authors have interpreted differences in the estimates of infrastructure returns across geographical units as pr oof that some areas may have exceeded their opti mal level of infrastructure stock, while others may be below it (Canning and Pedroni, 2004; Devarajan et al. 1996 ; see discussion in de Romp and Haan, 2005) . Different conclusions have emerged depending on the econometric techniques used, from simple panel estimations to sophisticated unit root testing. While the question of the optimal stock of infrastructure is obviously an important one (see Gramlich, 1994) , what has been missing, however, is a positive theory, and related empirical tests, of the decision to invest in infrastructure that could guide the optimality assessment. In this sense, the most promising area appears to be the political economy approach.
Indeed there is a presumption that decisions to invest in infrastructure, be it directly through public budgets or by calling on the private sector through some form of PPP, also respond to political motives rather than simple economic efficiency considerations. Porkbarrel, electoral pandering, etc., provide theoretical channels through which investment may be suboptimal and returns may be affected. Examples of such analysis are in Robinson and Torvik (2005) , Maskin and Tirole (2004; and Dewatripont and Seabright (2005) India, Duflo and Pande (2007) conclude that the microeconomic impact depends on the local institutional framework, and in particular that the lack of redistribution from "winners" to "losers" is especially felt in areas where institutions, for historical reasons, favor the politically and economically well-connected agents. Rauch (1995) shows, using data from US cities in the first two decades of the twentieth century that an educated bureaucracy and adequate formal functioning rules in terms of recruitment, tenure, etc., are instrumental in allowing the c hoice and successful realization of long-matured infrastructure projects. In this sense, a professionalization of the bureaucracy that to some extent constrains politicians and limits opportunism, makes better choices more likely or at least reduces the risk that that long-gestation-period projects be replaced by short term ones for electoral considerations. Finally, Henisz and Zelner (2000) argue, on the basis of cross-country evidence from the electricity sector, that the investment incentives of private firms are affected by a combination of the level of political constraints on politicians and the degree of interest-group intervention in the organization and regulation of the industry.
Again, this potential policy endogeneity presents a challenge for econometric studies.
Indeed, if infrastructure investment decisions are the result of an endogenous policy process, the expected signs may not be the obvious ones, a point forcefully made in Rodrik (2005) for the cross-country growth literature. A simple example would be the fact that if countries deciding to increase their infrastructure investment are precisely the ones where the existing stock is def icient, and the resulting improvement to th e infrastructure stock is only partial still leaving this group of countries with lower average stocks, the expected sign would then be negative despite the fact that the effect of this investment might be positive for this specific group of countries. This therefore requires the right specification of the underlying model and may be addressed by one of the IV strategies discussed above (reverse causality or u nobserved effects) and by the use of simultaneous-equation models, as in Cadot et al. (2006) .
Conclusion
This survey has reviewed the existing macroeconomic level literature on the link between infrastructure and development in a critical light. It has shown that this literature suffers from several related problems. First, i t often fails to lay down clearly the relevant theoretical questions to be addressed. Second, it also tends to ignore the fact that most relevant answers, from a policy point of view, cannot be meaningfully addressed with the type of data avai lable. Within these limitations, the last section has highlighted some of the potential areas for further work, bridging the gap with related literatures such as the ones on regulation and political economy. It is clear, however, that major advances in this area will require both more theory and better data sets, that go beyond the macroeconomic level, to combine the existing insights with those from sector-and project-level microeconomic studies, integrate the spatial dimension, and allow policy makers to better assess the potential linkages between specific infrastructure investments and growth. Assessing the corresponding priorities for research and data development is the object of ongoing research (see Straub, 2007) .
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